Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act - Commercial Activity Exception - United States May Exercise Jurisdiction Over A Foreign Sovereign Who Has Issued Promissory Notes To A U.S. Corporation. Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir. 1991). by Jay, Gregory
FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ACT-COMMERCIAL
ACTIVITY EXCEPTION-UNITED STATES MAY EXERCISE
JURISDICTION OVER A FOREIGN SOVEREIGN WHO HAS
ISSUED PROMISSORY NOTES To A U.S.
CORPORATION,-Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930
F.2d 1013, (2d Cir. 1991).
I. FACTS
Bernard Larry Tractman is president and sole shareholder of In-
ternational Promotions and Ventures, Ltd. ("IPVL").' Individually,
and later collectively with IPVL, he registered with the United States
Department of Justice as an agent of the Republic of Bolivia. 2 Tract-
man was engaged in negotiations for the purchase by the Bolivian
Air Force of used NATO aircraft.3
In September of 1981, the Bolivian Air Force and IPVL entered
into a contract ("Contract") in which IPVL agreed to supply fifty-
two Starfighter jets and related equipment and services in exchange
for negotiable promissory notes guaranteed by the Central Bank of
Bolivia.4 Under the terms of the agreement, Bolivia was required to
issue the notes upon execution of the Contract; however, the Contract
expressly required IPVL to return the notes if the United States
Government acting through the Department of State declined to
approve the transfer of the aircraft.'
I International Promotions and Ventures, Ltd. ("IPVL") is a Delaware cor-
poration with its principal place of business in New York City. Shaprio v. Republic
of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013, 1014 (2d Cir. 1991).
2 Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1015.
I d. The aircraft were F-104 Starfighter jets owned by the Government of
Belgium and manufactured in the United States.
4Id.
' Id. The parties were aware that Belgium could not sell the aircraft in question
unless a transfer license was issued by the U.S. State Department pursuant to 22
C.F.R. § 123.10 (1990). Additionally, the parties recognized that the United States
Government policy opposed the sale of military equipment to Bolivia. Realizing that
the license might not be granted, the parties expressly agreed to condition the 1981
contract upon defendants obtaining such license. See Office of the Comptroller
General v. International Promotions and Ventures, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. 202, 204
(S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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In December of 1981, Bolivia issued a series of negotiable prom-
issory notes numbered 1 through 40.6 Notes 1 through 10 were issued
to the Belgium Air Force and Notes 11 through 40 were issued to
IPVL.7 IPVL received some of the notes in Bolivia and others, such
as Note 12, were sent directly to the United States.' However, the
Starfighter jets were never delivered, because the State Department
refused to issue the necessary transfer license. 9
In June of 1983, the Honorable Edwin G. Corr, United States
Ambassador to Bolivia, wrote to the Comptroller General of Bolivia
stating that the United States did not deem it feasible to grant the
authorization of the sale.' 0 Upon receipt of the letter, the Republic
of Bolivia requested return of the promissory notes." Although the
deal was terminated, IPVL refused to return Note 12 and Notes 21
through 40.12 The Republic of Bolivia then commenced an action in
the District Court for the Southern District of New York against
Tractman and IPVL seeking to recover possession of the outstanding
notes or, alternatively, to recover damages. 3 In September of 1985,
Judge Bernard Newman 4 granted Bolivia summary judgment and
IPVL was ordered to return the notes or if "unable or unwilling"




9 Id. See supra note 5, and accompanying text.
10 The Honorable Edwin G. Corr wrote:
[Diuring conversations in 1981 between the United States Government and
the Belgian Government, the Government of the United States indicated
that it would not give its authorization for the transfer to the Bolivian Air
Force of 52 F-104 airplanes, owned by Belgium Air Force, in accordance
with our arms Export Control Act. On several occasions previous to March
23, 1982, the Department of State conveyed verbally this decision also to
Mr. Bernard L. Tractman, Manager of International Promotions and Ven-
tures Limited.
To date, there is no reason to modify this judgment and my Government
does not deem it feasible to grant the authorization requested of us.
Office of the Comptroller General v. International Promotions and Ventures, Ltd.,
618 F.Supp. at 205.
1 Id.
2 Id. at 206. Belgium returned Notes I through 10 upon Bolivia's request. Shapiro,
930 F.2d at 1015. IPVL's Bolivian agent returned Note 11 and Notes 13 through
20. Id.
,3 See Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1015; Office of the Comptroller General v. Inter-
national Promotions and Ventures, Ltd., 618 F. Supp. at 204.
" Senior Judge of the United States Court of International Trade sitting by
designation. Shaprio, 930 F.2d at 1015 n.2.
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to do so, pay damages for the face amount of the notes plus accrued
interest totalling $33.01 million. 5
In June of 1986, IPVL and Tractman filed petitions for bankruptcy,
yet failed to return the notes or pay damages to Bolivia. 6 This resulted
in an ongoing Chapter 7 proceeding in bankruptcy court. 7
In December of 1986, Appellant David Shapiro commenced his
action in the District Court for the Southern District of New York
against the Republic of Bolivia, the Bolivian Air Force, and the
Central Bank of Bolivia." Shapiro is a United States citizen who
maintains a residence in New York, but primarily resides in Hong
Kong, and is a director of Attlee Investments, Ltd., a Hong Kong
corporation that organizes joint ventures and transactions in com-
mercial paper and commodities.1 9 Shapiro alleged that he held Note
12 and that the Central Bank of Bolivia refused payment. 20 He sought
as relief the face value of the note, $1,426,000 plus accrued interest. 2'
The means by which Shapiro obtained Note 12 is in dispute, and
appellees deny any knowledge of how Shapiro obtained the note.2
Before discovery, appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds
of forum non conveniens and alleging that the district court lacked
11 Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1015.
Id.
Id. In September of 1986, Bolivia initiated an adversary proceeding, seeking
recovery of the outstanding notes and denial of Tractman's request for discharge
of the IPVL judgment. Bolivia's application was denied by the bankruptcy court
and an appeal is pending. Id.




22 Id. at 1015, 1016. In Shapiro, Circuit Judge Winter dealt only with jurisdictional
questions relating to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Concerning the means
of obtaining Note 12, Judge Winter stated, "[W]hether Shapiro can surmount the
formidable hurdle presented by the claim that he is not a bona fide purchaser of
Note 12, [is] not before us." Id.
Shapiro alleges in his affidavit that in March of 1982 IPVL was seeking a purchaser
for Notes 21 through 40, and that in exchange for Attlee locating a purchaser IPVL
would pay a commission. A potential buyer was found, but the deal fell through
and Attlee did not receive a commission. Cesar Sisson, a creditor of IPVL, then
took possession of Notes 21 through 40 as collateral for outstanding loans. In
September of 1983, Sisson sought Attlee's help in selling the Notes. "In or about
the end of October 1983," Sisson transferred Note 12 to Attlee as its commission
for having found a willing buyer in 1982. Shapiro alleges that Attlee itself eventually
purchased Notes 21 through 40 and continues to hold them. In August of 1986,
almost one year after IPVL and Tractman were ordered to return the Notes, Shapiro
personally "purchased" Note 12 from Attlee. Id. at 1015, 1016.
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subject matter and personal jurisdiction.23 The magistrate recom-
mended that the motion be denied.24 Judge Lowe, United States
District Court Judge for the Southern District of New York, however,
disagreed, holding that under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976 (FSIA),25 appellees were immune from the jurisdiction of the
courts of the United States. 26 She rejected any exception to the FSIA,
stating that appellees had not waived their immunity pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) 7 by initiating the IPVL suit and bankruptcy
adversary proceeding, nor had appellees engaged in any "commercial
activity carried on in the United States" as would subject them to
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).u On July 25, 1990, the
district court entered a judgment dismissing the complaint, from which
Shapiro appealed."
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Circuit Judge Winter, held,
that while appellees did not waive their sovereign immunity pursuant
2 Id. "Forum non conveniens refers to the discretionary power of a court to
decline jurisdiction when the convenience of the parties and ends of justice would
be better served if the action were brought and tried in another forum." Johnson
v. Spider Staging Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 577 at 579, 555 P.2d 997, 999 (1976); see 28
U.S.C.A. § 1401 (West Supp. 1991). Forum non conveniens comes into play only
when venue is proper in the first instance. Also, dismissal on the basis of forum
non conveniens requires that there be an alternative forum in which the suit can be
prosecuted. See Johnson, 87 Wash. 2d. 577, 555 P.2d 997 (1976).
Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1016; see Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, No. 86 Civ.
9935 (MJL) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1989) (report and recommendation of Magistrate
Roberts).
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11 (1988). See H.R.
REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 6 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604, 6605 (discussion of restrictive immunity).
Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1016.
Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1016. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(l) (1988) provides:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts
of the United States or of the States in any case (1) in which the foreign
state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication, not with-
standing any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may purport
to effect in accordance with the terms of the waiver.
" Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1016. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1988) provides:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of
the United States or of the States in any case ... (2) in which the action
is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the
foreign state, or upon an act performed in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in
the United States.
Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, No. 86 Civ. 9935 (MJL), 1990 WL 100908
(S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1990) (opinion and order).
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to section 1605(a)(1), they did carry on "commercial activity" suf-
ficient to invoke the exception under section 1605(a)(2) and subject
them to the court's jurisdiction. 0 This holding expands the boundary
of the "commercial activity" exception under the FSIA, by finding
that debt issued to a United States corporation is sufficient substantial
contact with the United States to invoke the commercial activity
exception. Shapiro v. Republic of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013 (2d Cir.
1991).
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Traditionally, the United States has granted absolute immunity to
all foreign states based upon principles of state sovereignty. 3' These
principles are embraced by the ideas of comity32 and reciprocity33 and
shaped by the conception that all states are equal and that no one
state may exercise authority over any other. In the 1940s, absolute
immunity began to erode, as no justification was present for allowing
foreign states unrestricted immunity under principles of modern in-
ternational law. In the United States, absolute immunity became a
"political question" heavily influenced by the Department of State
and controlled by the executive branch of government3 4 until 1952
30 Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1016. For purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act a commercial activity may be regular conduct or an individual transaction so
long as its nature rather than its purpose is the determining factor. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(d) (1988).
31 See Schooner-Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812) (Chief Justice John
Marshall, in deciding that a French warship in a United States port was immune
from the jurisdiction of the United States courts, concluded that no foreign sovereign
would subject itself to the absolute and exclusive power of another state without
an implied understanding that entry into the foreign territory included a grant of
immunity from the territorial sovereign's power).
32 The 3rd circuit defined comity as "[a] recognition which one nation extends
within its own territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another. It
is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience, and expediency . . . . It is
a nation's expression of understanding which demonstrates due regard both to
international duty and convenience and to the'rights of persons protected by its own
laws." Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1017 (1972).
33 "International law is founded upon mutuality and reciprocity, and by the
principles of international law recognized in most civilized nations . . ." Hilton v.
Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895).
3, No judicial analysis regarding immunity occurred during this time, but rather
the Department of State would request immunity in nearly all cases involving foreign
sovereigns with whom the United States maintained good relations.
19911
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when the State Department adopted the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity.35
The restrictive theory recognizes immunity for public governmental
acts of state, but not private commercial acts.36 The Department of
State felt the increasing engagement of foreign sovereigns in com-
mercial activities with private citizens justified a private citizen the
right to adjudicate a matter against a foreign sovereign in court.17
However, the Department of State often acquiesced to diplomatic
pressures and the restrictive theory was not applied in a consistent
fashion.3" The judiciary, although free from political pressure, was
often at odds with the Department of State. 39
In an attempt to produce consistency and gain legitimacy, Congress
passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 to codify the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.4 This action was in line
with other foreign states who had restricted immunity through leg-
" Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State, to
Acting Attorney General, Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T
ST. BuLL. 984, 985 (1952) [commonly and hereinafter cited as Tate Letter]. Mr Tate
said the United States would operate under a restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
See also Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983).
36 See Tate letter, supra note 35. Mr Tate stated in his letter:
According to the classical or absolute theory of sovereign immunity, a
sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a respondent in the courts
of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory of sov-
ereign immunity, the immunity of the sovereign is recognized with regard
to public or sovereign acts (jure imperi) of a state, but not with respect
to private acts (jure gestionis)... [lilt will hereafter be the Department's
policy to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the con-
sideration of request of foreign governments for a grant of sovereign
immunity.
3" Id.
38 Foreign countries would exert their influence using "diplomatic pressure on
the State Department" in securing immunity. The process was highly politicized.
See Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. at 487.
19 See H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 7 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 6606 (Foreign sovereigns circumvented the judiciary by using
their influence with the Department of State to garner immunity. The judiciary often
relied on recommendations by the executive branch in deciding whether to grant
immunity.)
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2892
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-11). See also Julia B. Brooke, Note, The International
Law Association Draft Convention on Foreign Sovereign Immunity: A Comparative
Approach, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 635 (1983). "One of the most crucial provisions of
any effort to codify sovereign immuntiy is the treatment of the activities of state
which participate in commercial activities and contracts. The belief that immunity
should not extend to such activities is the heart of the theory of restrictive immunity."
Brooke, supra, at 651.
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islative form. 4' The FSIA provides a guideline as to when a foreign
state may be sued in United States courts. 42 Claims of jurisdictional
immunity are to be determined by federal and state courts in con-
formity with the principles set out in the Act. 43 The FSIA adds the
United States to an increasing number of western nations that have
abandoned the absolute theory of sovereign immunity. 4 Congress
recognized that "American citizens are increasingly coming into con-
tact with foreign states and entities owned by foreign states," and
that "there are no comprehensive provisions in our law available to
inform parties when they can have recourse to the [federal] courts
to assert a legal claim against a foreign state." '45
The FSIA is the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign
state in the United States courts.4 The immunity provisions creating
subject matter jurisdiction include the contacts necessary for personal
jurisdiction.4 7 Therefore, "subject matter jurisdiction plus service of
process equals personal jurisdiction. '48
41 The United Kingdom enacted the State Immunity Act of 1978, 26 & 27 Eliz.
2, ch. 33, 17 I.L.M. 1123; in 1982, Canada enacted its Act to Provide for State
Immunity in Canadian Courts, 29, 30 & 31 Eliz. 2, ch. 95, 21 I.L.M. 798; Pakistan,
Singapore, and South Africa have enacted similar statutes. See U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/
SER.B/20 (1982).
The Council of Europe has developed a European Convention on State Immunity
and Additional Protocol, Basle, May 16, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 470 (1972). This convention
enumerates the specific instances in which a contracting state is not immune from
jurisdiction in the courts of another contracting country.
42 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (1988) provides six exceptions when a foreign state shall
not be immune from the jurisidiction of the courts of the United States.
43 28 U.S.C. § 1602.
" Great Britain and the European Community ("EC") have officially adopted
the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. European Convention on State Im-
munity, May 16, 1973, Europ. T.S. No. 74 at 1, reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 470 (1972);
State Immunity Act of 1978, 26 & 27 Eliz. 2, ch. 33, 17 I.L.M. 1123 (Great Britain).
For commentary on the European Convention see Sinclair, The European Convention
on State Immunity, 22 INT'L & Comp. L. Q. 254, 266-83 (1973); K. Phillip Knierim,
Comment, Sovereign Immunity from Judicial Enforcement: The Impact of the
European Convention on State Immunity, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 130 (1973).
For commentary on Great Britain see A.O. Adede, The United Kingdom Abandons
the Doctrine of Absolute Sovereign Immunity, 6 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 197 (1980).
41 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 25, at 6, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6605.
46 Shapiro v. Rep. of Bolivia, 930 F.2d 1013, 1017 (2d Cir. 1991) ("The FSIA
is the exclusive source of subject matter jurisdiction in suits involving foreign states.");
see More de Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d, 790, 793 (2d Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985).
To entertain an action, a court must have jurisdiction over the parties to the
action (personal jurisdiction), jurisdiction over the controversy or dipute (subject
matter jurisdiction), and proper venue.
'7 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a), subject matter jurisdiction exists with respect to
1991]
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Although the FSIA starts from a premise of immunity, it provides
exceptions to the general principle. 49 The most common exception is
the commercial activity exception arising under 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 50
Cases dealing with the commercial activity exception include the
issuance of public debt5 and breach of contract by a foreign state.
5 2
every action against a foreign state to which the foreign state is not entitled to
immunity.
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction . . . of any nonjury
civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title
as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to which the foreign
state is not entitled to immunity ....
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1(1982).
48 Texas Trading & Milling Corp., v. Fed. Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 307
(2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
49 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605. The statute
provides that the following are exempted from judicial immunity: cases where the
foreign state has effected a valid waiver either explicitly or implicitly; cases where
the foreign sovereign carries on commercial activity in the United States or activity
that has a direct effect in the United States; cases where international legal issues
arise surrounding the seizure of land; cases where the dispute surrounds property
located in the United States that was acquired by gift or inheritance; cases in which
the dispute involves maritime liens; and cases where money damages are sought for
an alleged tortious action by the foreign state. See id. at § 1605.
50 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) sets out three distinct situations under which the com-
mercia activity exception applies. See supra note 28.
51 See, e.g., West v. Multibanco Comermex, S.A., 807 F.2d 820, 825 (9th Cir.
1987) (certificates of deposit issued by Mexican national banks), cert. denied, 482
U.S. 906, (1987); Carl Marks & Co. v. USSR, 841 F.2d 26, 27 (2d Cir. 1988) (bearer
bonds and credit participation certificates of Russian Imperial Government), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1219, (1988) (per curiam); see also H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra
note 25, at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6615 (including indebtedness
incurred by a foreign state as commercial activity).
52 See, e.g., Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 300, 310-13 (the commercial activity
exception was invoked when a breach of a contract to purchase cement and breach
of related letters of credit at a U.S. bank were deemed sufficient to constitute
jurisdiction); Gemini Shipping,. Inc. v. Foreign Trade Org. for Chems. and Food-
stuffs, 647 F.2d 317, 319 (2d Cir. 1981) (chartering a ship delivering grain from a
United States food grain program to a foreign state-owned company were considered
import-export transactions sufficient to constitute jurisdiction); but see International
Ass'n of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553, 576 (C.D.
Cal. 1979) (the nature of OPEC's activity was not deemed commercial but govern-
mental, and subject to immunity), aff'd, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea,
693 F.2d 1094, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Guinea's commercial activites were not
comprehensive enough to invoke the exception), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 815 (1983);
Zedan v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 849 F.2d 1511 (D.C. Cir 1988) (breach of
contract by an American worker who performed a contract in Saudi Arabia was
not sufficient to fulfill the "direct effect" clause under the commercial activity
exception).
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The FSIA defines commercial activity as a "regular course of com-
mercial conduct or particular commercial transaction or act." 53 Con-
gress grappled with the issue of developing a test for defining a
commercial act, but instead decided to leave a large amount of latitude
and discretion to the courts.1
Despite guidance from Congress, the United States courts have
encountered a tremendous amount of difficulty in interpreting and
applying the commercial activity exception. Whether trying to classify
an activity as governmental or commercial, or attempting to distin-
guish between the nature or purpose of an activity, courts have
produced different holdings based on seemingly similar facts. 5 Ad-
ditionally, the United States Supreme Court has never interpreted the
provisions of the FSIA. 56
In Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria,
the Second Circuit established guidelines interpreting the commercial
activity exception.5 7 The court first defined the act and activity in-
volved; then determined whether the activity fell within the definition;
and finally characterized the activity as either commercial or gov-
ernmental5 8 It is interesting to note that the court in Texas Trading
characterized the FSIA as "a new and vaguely-worded statute" whose
drafters deliberately left the decision of many difficult questions to
the federal courts. 59
M 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d).
14 See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 25, at 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6615. The House report stated, "The courts would have a great deal of latitude
in determining what is a commercial activity for purposes of this bill. It has seemed
unwise to attempt an excessively precise definition of this term, even if that were
practicable."
55 See, e.g., Segni v. Commerical Office of Spain, 835 F.2d 160, 163 (7th Cir.
1987) (reviewing approaches of other circuits, finding the nature/purpose distinction
problematic); DeSanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1391 (5th
Cir. 1985) (grappling with defining nature of activity).
56 Marie Sunder, Comment, Jurisdiction-Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Re-
defining the Commercial Activity Exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities
Act, Millen Industries Inc. v. Coordination Council for North Amercian Affairs,
855 F.2d 879 (D.C. Cir. 1988), 13 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 911, 917 (1990); see,
e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480 (1983) (where Supreme
Court did not attempt to interpret the FSIA provisions, but held that allowing a
foreign state to be sued by foreign plaintiff on a nonfederal cause of action did
not violate Article III of the Constitution).
1 Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d 300, passim (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
58 Id.
19 Id. at 302-03.
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In Ministry of Supply, Cairo v. Universe Tankships, Inc.,6° the
court focused on the first clause of section 1605(a)(2), which creates
an exception where an action "is based upon a commercial activity
carried on in the United States by a foreign state. .. 61 The court
reasoned that an exception to immunity is provided on claims based
outside the United States if the act constitutes a particular commercial
transaction having "substantial contact with the United States. '62
The courts have taken different approaches in interpreting and
applying the commercial activity exception. Each court has crafted
different tests63 and the required relationship between the commercial
activity and the plaintiff's claim has never been clearly established. 64
III. ANALYSiS
A. Shapiro-The Second Circuit's Analysis of the Commercial
Activity Exception Under Section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA
From both a legal and a policy standpoint, the Second Circuit's
holding in Shapiro was the result of practical analysis and sound
judgment. The Second Circuit considered whether the commercial
activity exception is applicable to a foreign state issuing promissory
notes to a United States corporation, where a note ultimately ended
up in the possession of a United States citizen. The decision in Shapiro
60 708 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1983).
6 28 U.S.C. 1605(a)(2).
62 Ministry of Supply, Cairo, 708 F.2d at 84.
See, e.g., De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua 770 F.2d 1385 (5th Cir.
1985) (in ascertaining whether commercial activity exception applies, court first must
define relevant activity with precision, focusing on acts of named defendant, not
other acts that may have had casual connection with suit; second, it must determine
whether relevant activity was sovereign or commercial, which determination depends
on nature of activity rather than on its purpose; third, if activity is commercial in
nature, court must determine whether it had requisite jurisdictional nexus with United
States); Ministry of Supply, Cairo v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 708 F.2d 80 (2d Cir
1983) (if the exception to immunity is provided on a claim based outside the United
States, the act must be a particular commercial transaction having substantial contact
with the United States.)
6" Compare In Re Rio Grande Transport, Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1155 (S.D.N.Y.
1981) (by defining commercial conduct broadly, Congress apparently did not intend
to require specific commercial transactions or acts upon which action is based to
have occurred in United States or to have had substantial contact with United States;
only broad course of conduct must be so connected) with Vencedora Oceanica
Navigacion, S.A. v. Compagnie Nationale Algerienne de Navigation (C.N.A.N.),
730 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1984) (to satisfy the first clause of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2),
a nexus must exist between defendant's commercial activity in the United States and
plaintiff's grievance).
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focused on section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA. 65 The court found that
Bolivia's transfer of a promissory note to IPVL, a United States
corporation, "constituted a 'commercial activity having . .. sub-
stantial contact with the United States."'' '6
The Shapiro court directed its attention to whether the commercial
activity had substantial contact with the United States. This per-
spective was in concert with past circuit decisions. 67 In Ministry of
Supply, Cairo v. Universe Tankships, Inc., the Second Circuit held
that the first clause of the commercial activity exception must be
read in light of the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e). That court
noted that a "commercial activity carried on in the United States by
a foreign state" is defined as "commercial activity carried on by
such state and having substantial contact with the United States." 6
Instead of examining whether Bolivia generally engaged in com-
mercial activity in the United States, the Shapiro court focused on
the particular incident giving rise to the substantial contact. The court
could have focused on Bolivia's purpose in the debt issuance, which
was to acquire Starfighter aircraft from Belgium. Under this analysis,
Bolivia would gain immunity.
However, the Shapiro court was in harmony with other cases in
considering the connection between Bolivia's commercial activity and
Shapiro's grievance. The court noted, "[I]t is clear that Congress
intended a tighter nexus than the 'minimum contacts' standard for
due process." 69 One interpretation is that Congress is calling for a
heightened level of contact, one greater than minimal. However, the
correct interpretation, applied by this court, is that Congress desired
more than a casual link between the activity in question and the
complaint. Here, the nexus was the issuance of promissory notes to
a United States company for the purpose of raising capital. The court
accurately pointed out that the notes physically traveled to the United
States and were placed in escrow in a Washington, D.C. law firm.70
No restrictions were present that limited IPVL from seeking to further
distribute the notes. The court concluded that "[t]he very presence
6, See supra note 28 for text of statutory provision.
Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1020 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e) (1988)).
67 Id. at 1018 (citing with approval, Ministry of Supply, Cairo v. Univese Tank-
ships, Inc., 708 F.2d 80, 84 (2d Cir. 1983); Colonia Bank v. Compagnie Generale
Maritime et Financiere, 645 F. Supp. 1457, 1461-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
68 Ministry of Supply, Cairo, 708 F.2d 84 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e)).
69 Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1019.
70 Id.
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of such highly transferable instruments, whether or not the initial
holder successfully discounts them in the country, suffices to satisfy
the 'substantial contact' requirement of the statute.' '17
B. Congressional Intent and Purpose Behind the FSIA
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals embraced many of the con-
gressional goals in finding an exception to immunity under the FSIA.
The FSIA codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity seeking
to prevent the past inconsistencies of application and to give legitimacy
to a theory often politicized. 72 Congress believed that by taking away
the question of jurisdiction from the executive branch, foreign policy
and political considerations in immunity decisions would disappear,
thus giving greater deference to due process concerns of private
persons suing foreign governments in United States courts. 7
Foremost, the Shapiro court complied with the Congressional pur-
pose behind creating the FSIA. The court relied on the language set
out in section 1605(a)(2) 7 4 and most importantly made use of the
statutory definitions given in section 1603(e) to interpret the language
as it applied to the present case. 75 The court was mindful of the
intent of Congress to provide private litigants access to courts,7 6 rather
than trying to find absolute definitions or formulate a rigid test. By
allowing a citizen who holds a debt instrument issued by a foreign
71 Id.
71 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 25, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6605. See also Goodwin E. Benjamin, Note, DeSanchez Banco Central De Nicaragua:
Too Many Exceptions to the Commiercial Activities Exception of the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunities Act of 1976?, 14 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 715, 740 (1988) ("The
purpose of the F.S.I.A. is to codify the means by which juridictional immunity
questions can be determined on a purely legal basis without having to contend with
or account for unwieldy political and foreign policy considerations.").
13 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 25, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6606. Before enactment of the FSIA, a private litigant faced little certainty or
reliabilty in disputes with foreign sovereigns. See also Tate Letter, supra note 35,
at 985 (State Department announced that it would no longer participate in sovereign
immunity determinations in cases involving commerical transactions with foreign
states, in order to allow persons doing business with those states to have their rights
determined in the courts).
" 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (the commercial activity exception under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunity Act).
71 Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1018, 1020. Section 1603(e) defines "commercial activity
carried on in the United States by a foreign state" as "commercial activity carried
on by such state and having substantial contact with the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1603(e).
76 See Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 312-13 (citing H.R. REp. No. 1487, supra note
25, at 77, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6605).
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government the ability to adjudicate a dispute, the court made foreign
states more amenable to suit in the United States. Also, Congress
has indicated that if the activity in question was one in which a
private person could engage, the court should invoke the commercial
activity exception. 77 Thousands of corporations issue debt in the form
of commercial paper, and private citizens write checks daily. The
Shapiro court's ruling that Bolivia's issuance of promissory notes was
a commercial activity accords with congressional intent, because Bo-
livia's issuance of the notes is a market exchange capable of being
engaged in by a private person.
Additionally, the Shapiro court reinforced prior judicial decisions
by reaffirming principles enumerated in earlier cases.78 This complied
with congressional goals of developing a consistent, uniform policy
in applying foreign sovereign immunity. 79
C. Accountability in a Global Economy
International business transactions are increasing at a rapid rate.
Political, cultural, and economic barriers are being broken, allowing
international commerce to become more widespread. The European
Community and recent free trade legislation concerning the United
States, Canada, and Mexico are just two illustrations of emerging
regional economies that will spur transactions between private cor-
porations or citizens and foreign states. These transactions will often
be facilitated through debt instruments issued by foreign sovereigns.
If these transactions are to be carried out with confidence and security,
sovereign states and entities must be accountable for their actions.80
7 Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearing on H.R.
3493 Before the Subcomm. on Claims and Governmental Relations of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1973), cited in 8 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 545 at 548 n.24 (1982). (Legal advisors to the Department of State offered a
basic rule of thumb to determine if immunity is to be granted: "If the activity is
one in which a private person can engage, it is not entitled to immunity." This
basic rule, the essence of the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity, was adopted
by Congress and codified in the FSIA.)
7 Shapiro, 930 F.2d at 1018-20 (following the substantial contact requirement
discussed in Ministry of Supply, Cairo, and 'citing other cases in analyzing the
connection between Bolivia's commercial activity in relation to the United States).
79 See H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 25, at 6-7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6604-06.
so Congress was aware of increased business activity of foreign sovereigns with
private citizens: "In a modern world where foreign state enterprises are every day
participants in commercial activities, H.R. 11315 is urgently needed." H.R. REP.
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The Shapiro court stated that although IPVL was required to return
the notes if the Starfighter jets were not delivered, Bolivia was liable
to any holder of the debt instrument; therefore, the notes were fully
negotiable. If the court had refused a private citizen his day in court
to adjudicate a matter concerning a promissory note worth over $1
million, confidence in international business transactions would be
hampered. If sovereign nations were not forced to stand behind their
issuances, debt instruments would significantly lose their marketa-
bility, drawing skepticism from investors. The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals in Shapiro embraces this policy concern by finding that
the U.S. District Court has jurisdiction over Bolivia.
D. Reciprocity in the Context of the FSIA
Traditionally, the United States has lagged behind the rest of the
Western World in formulating sovereign immunity policy.8' A number
of other nations have long recognized a distinction between private
and public governmental transactions.8 2 Since World War II, western
countries have increasingly exercised jurisdiction over the United States
to adjudicate various matters.83 Because international commerce is
No. 1487, supra note 25, at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6605.
H.R. 11315 was the bill defining jurisdiction of U.S. courts in suits against foreign
states, and the circumstances for foreign state immunity, which was passed with
amendments as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976. See id. at 1, reprinted
in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6604.
, [W]hen the United States first became involved in foreign suits on a large
scale, foreign counsel retained by the Department of Justice were instructed
to plead sovereign immunity in almost every instance. However, the executive
branch learned that almost every country in Western Europe followed the
restrictive principle of sovereign immunity ....
H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 25, at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6607.
82 This distinction between private and public acts is the cornerstone of the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. Jack B. Tate, Legal Advisor to Dept. of
State, said in 1956,
The newer or restrictive theory of sovereign immunity has always been
supported by the courts of Belgium and Italy. It was adopted in turn by
the courts of Egypt and of Switzerland. In addition, the courts of France,
Austria, and Greece, which were traditionally supporters of the classical
theory, reversed their position in the 20's to embrace the restrictive theory.
Romania, Peru, and possibly Denmark also appear to follow this theory.
See Tate Letter, supra note 35.
83 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 25, at 9, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6607. The purchase of goods and services by our embassies, employment of local
personnel by our military bases, and accidents involving U.S. Government-owned
vehicles are some cases in which the United States stood trial in foreign courts. Id.
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growing, the United States must be mindful that a transaction which
does or does not warrant jurisdiction in the United States will be
seen as a signal for a foreign state to apply its law to a United
States' transaction."
The FSIA drafters intended to make the United States' sovereign
immunity practice compatible with that of other nations.85 In Texas
Trading, 6 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals had little alternative
but to invoke the commercial activity exception, as the United King-
dom and West Germany had previously rendered a decision exercising
jurisdiction over Nigeria. 7 This illustrates that courts are attuned to
other nations' decisions and to principles of international law.88
A number of countries have approached the immunity question by
separating out political activities and then considering all other com-
mercial activities. The German Supreme Constitutional Court, in
deciding a case in which a private firm sued Iran for non-payment
of a bill allegedly incurred in the repair of the Iranian Embassy's
heating system, said: "It is obvious that the conclusion of such a
contract does not fall within the core of the state's political au-
thority. '"89 Also illustrative is an Italian Court of Cassation decision
denying immunity to the United States in holding that the transaction
was of a private law nature even though done for a military purpose.9
In Shapiro, the Second Circuit's analysis was somewhat in accord
with foreign courts when it defined Bolivia's activity as commercial
and not political. The court looked beyond Bolivia's desire to acquire
military aircraft and recognized that facilitating a transaction by
94 See, Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953) (discussion on principles of
comity and existence of national power).
85 H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 25, at 6-7, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
at 6605-06.
86 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981).
87 See Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 300 (the commercial activity exception was
invoked when a breach of a contract to purchase cement and breach of related
letters of credit at a United States bank were deemed sufficient to constitute juris-
diction).
88 See Jill K. Simon, Note, Sovereign Immunity, 8 BROOK. J. INT'L L., 545, 551
(1982).
89 16 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] 27 (1963), cited in Louis HENKIN, ET.
AL. INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 504 (1980).
- Governo degli Stati Uniti di America c. Soc. I.R.S.A., [1963] Foro It. 1405,
47 Revista de Diritto Internazionale 484 (1963), cited in HENKIN, supra note 89, at
504 (the United States claimed immunity through diplomatic channels in a suit
brought in Italy by an Italian company that had built sewers for the U.S. Logistic
Command in Italy, on the ground that the case arose from activity of the United
States Government in its capacity as a sovereign.)
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issuing promissory notes to a United State corporation is not political,
but rather a private commercial activity.
The Shapiro holding will help in formulating international rules
and precedent concerning debt litigation involving foreign sovereigns.
However, inherent in this decision is that a U.S. governmental entity
issuing commercial paper will subject itself to the jurisdiction of other
courts under principles of reciprocity.
E. Ramification of Shapiro
Shapiro represents a victory for the framers of the Foreign Sov-
ereign Immunity Act. The court embraced many of Congress's goals
and was equally mindful of congressional intent in codifying the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity.
The court laid a foundation upon which future debt-related actions
under the FSIA can be analyzed. If debt instrument financing is
facilitated through an entity doing business in the United States,
sufficient substantial contact is present with the United States to find
an exception to immunity. Attempting to raise capital by introducing
negotiable promissory notes into the United States, regardless of where
the ultimate holder resides, should put foreign state entities on notice
that they are carrying out a commercial activity within the purview
of the FSIA.
IV. CONCLUSION
David Shapiro brought an action against the Republic of Bolivia
seeking to enforce a promissory note on which he was refused pay-
ment. Bolivia had originally issued the notes to IPVL, an American
corporation, pursuant to an agreement in which IPVL had agreed
to supply jet aircraft to the Bolivian Air Force.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that Bolivia's issuance
of negotiable promissory notes involved substantial contact with the
United States for purposes of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's
commercial activity exception. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
provides a guideline as to when a foreign state may be sued in the
United States courts.
With its decision in Shapiro, the Second Circuit has provided
progressive analysis that addresses debt issuance in the context of the
commercial activity exception. The court reaffirmed principles it enu-
merated in earlier cases, by asking if Bolivia's commercial activity
had substantial contact with the United States.
The FSIA is an ambiguous legislative scheme designed to give courts
latitude and flexibility. However, this flexibility has led courts to
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wander in many different directions, providing little guidance. Shapiro
utilized past judicial decisions and statutory definitions, fostering
continuity and avoiding the inconsistent application that Congress
intended to guard against. As international commerce grows, the
holding in Shapiro will shape jurisdiction concerning sovereign debt
issuance. The decision gives foreign states notice that by issuing
commercial paper to American concerns they are engaging in a "com-
mercial activity" having "substantial contact" with the United States.
Gregory Jay

